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An experimental investigation of the role of uniqueness and familiarity in
interpreting definite descriptions
Sadhwi Srinivas and Kyle Rawlins∗
1 Introduction
In this study, we follow a long line of researchers in asking about the precise role of uniqueness and
familiarity in the semantics of the English definite article the. We attempt to answer this question
experimentally, by observing how definite descriptions behave in contexts where a speaker poten-
tially uses an incorrect description, as in Donnellan’s 1966 classic martini scenario, where a speaker
incorrectly believes there is a unique referent for their chosen description. In particular, we inves-
tigate how hearers interpret definite descriptions in contexts that are systematically manipulated to
vary in whether they do or don’t contain a unique referent satisfying the description, and whether
the referent has or has not been made familiar via previous linguistic mention.
Our experimental results reveal that both uniqueness (construed as uniqueness with respect to
the common ground between the interlocutors) and familiarity (construed as strong familiarity or
anaphoricity) can act as helpful cues to the hearer during the interpretation of a definite description.
However, their effects are graded, with the presence of uniqueness leading to greater referential
success than the presence of familiarity. We discuss the implications of these results on several
existing standard theories of definiteness, and implement a version of the Rational Speech Acts
model (Frank and Goodman 2012) to help explain the ways in which the observed behavioral data
cannot be fully explained on these theories.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this section, we introduce
some of the prominent standard theories of definiteness in the literature. In Section 2, we describe
our experimental design and present an analysis of the resulting data. In Section 3, we describe and
test our rational computational model. Section 4 concludes.
1.1 Existing Theories of Definiteness
There are two main points on which standard theories of definiteness diverge.1 First, theories may
differ in how they explain the ‘uniqueness’ effect that commonly seems to arise with definite de-
scriptions. This effect is exemplified in (1-2) below. (1) is infelicitous when uttered out of the blue
because classes typically involve more than one student, but on this assumption it is unclear which
student is being talked about. However, no such problem arises with (2), where the superlative defi-
nite description picks out the unique tallest student in the class. While traditional uniqueness-based
theories can be construed as advocating for uniqueness of the referent within a restricted domain
of the physical world (Russell 2005, Evans 1977), there are other researchers who have proposed
weaker notions of uniqueness such as uniqueness within the common ground (Roberts 2003), and
uniqueness within the narrow discourse context (Kamp 1981, Heim 1982).
(1) # The student in my class came to my office hour.
(2) The tallest student in my class came to my office hour.
Definites are also commonly described as being associated with ‘familiarity’ effects, originally
attributed to Christopherson (1939), and developed in detail in Heim (1982). According to familiar-
ity theories, definite descriptions pick out a ‘familiar’ entity, or one that has been discussed previ-
ously in the discourse— as opposed to introducing a newly mentioned entity. This is often described
not in terms of familiar entities per se, but familiar ‘discourse referents’, as opposed to ‘novel’ or
∗We would like to thank the audiences and reviewers at CiALT-2 (Berlin), CUNY 2019 (CU, Boulder) and
PLC-43, Daphna Heller, and the members of the semantics lab at JHU for useful feedback.
1The literature on definiteness is larger than we can review in this paper. For recent overviews, including
discussion that goes beyond what we term ‘standard’ theories, see Schwarz 2013, Coppock and Beaver 2015,
Ludlow 2018, Aguilar-Guevara et al. 2019, Ahn 2019 (among others).
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new referents (Karttunen 1976). (3-4) exemplifies such a familiarity effect. In (3), the man refers
to the already familiar man introduced in the preceding sentence who the speaker met, and without
such a familiar referent, (4) becomes odd. Note that (3) is felicitous even when uttered in a room full
of other men, apparently undermining several obvious formulations of a uniqueness requirement, but
(4) may also be explained on a uniqueness theory as a failure of uniqueness relative to the world.
Once again, theories differ in what notions of familiarity they use to explain the effect in (3). The
two most prominent definitions that we will consider are strong familiarity or anaphoricity (Heim
1982), and weak familiarity or familiarity entailed by existence of the referent (Roberts 2003).
(3) (in a room full of men) I met a man yesterday. The man was wearing a kilt.
(4) (discourse-initial, out of the blue) # The man was wearing a kilt.
Below, we review in more detail each instantiation of uniqueness and familiarity that features
prominently in the literature. Traditional neo-Russellian theories of definiteness often propose a
strong uniqueness requirement, where the referent identified by the definite description must be
unique in some suitably restricted subset of the world. This is a more absolute notion of uniqueness,
crucially agnostic of the knowledge (or the lack thereof) of the interlocutors themselves. Roberts
(2003) refers to this type of uniqueness as Semantic Uniqueness, and we will also henceforth adopt
this terminology. Such a construal of uniqueness is able to successfully explain the data in (1)-(2),
with the speaker’s class representing the domain of interpretation.
Roberts herself proposes a weaker notion of uniqueness, which she terms Informational Unique-
ness. In simple terms, informational uniqueness is satisfied if the definite description picks out a
unique referent within the Common Ground shared between the interlocutors, regardless of whether
uniqueness holds with respect to the actual world. Roberts’ theory also successfully explains the
contrast between (1) and (2) once the reasonable assumption is made that both the speaker and
hearer know there is more than one student in the class, as well as the familiarity failure in (4).
The third and weakest notion of uniqueness we consider here is that of Discourse Uniqueness,
originally due to Heim (1982). Here, uniqueness is required to hold only with respect to the dis-
course context, where the discourse context is defined narrowly as consisting only of those items that
have been explicitly introduced via prior mention or via a very high degree of contextual salience2.
Requiring only this weakest form of uniqueness successfully explains the contrast in (3-4). It is
unclear how semantic/informational uniqueness can straightforwardly account for this example.
The discourse uniqueness that Heim (1982) considers necessary to make a definite description
felicitous is not conventionally encoded as a presupposition of the definite article itself (in contrast
to other uniqueness approaches). Instead, it emerges as a consequence of a different presupposition
associated with the definite article, i.e., that the entity or referent picked out by the description is
“strongly familiar” in the discourse context. Strong Familiarity is primarily said to arise through an
explicit previous mention, as in (3). Under a theory of strong familiarity, the discourse uniqueness
is only needed in order to enable successful identification of the antecedent, as the presence of more
than one strongly familiar entity satisfying the description would result in an unresolvable ambiguity.
Roberts (2003) accepts that strong familiarity is sufficient to license definiteness, but consid-
ers it too strong to be a necessary condition. She offers an alternative, weaker characterization of
familiarity—termed as Weak Familiarity. Any entity whose existence is entailed by the context is
said to satisfy weak familiarity. Under this approach, it is the combination of informational unique-
ness and weak familiarity that licenses the use of a definite description. For example, the definite
in (5) is felicitous in a context where there is only one pen in the vicinity (and therefore only one
pen in the common ground), and where both interlocutors are aware of the existence of the pen but
it hasn’t been mentioned before.
(5) Can you pass me the the pen?
Finally, there are proposals that deem adequately strong notions of uniqueness and familiarity
as independently sufficient conditions for the felicitous use of definite descriptions. We will discuss
2Heim does not give an account of what items are considered contextually salient, and what the necessary
and sufficient conditions for contextual salience are. Here, we restrict ourselves to previous mention alone.
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two such proposals, the first of which is due to Schwarz (2009). Backed by German data which
shows differential morphological marking for definites interpreted based on uniqueness vs. those in-
terpreted anaphorically, Schwarz proposes that languages can allow reference disambiguation using
either of the two strategies independently. For languages like English which do not morphologically
distinguish between unique and familiar uses of definites, an ambiguity based analysis is suggested.
This means that there are two independent lexical entries for English the—one of which encodes a
uniqueness presupposition while the other is based on strong familiarity.
Farkas (2002) also advocates for an account that admits both uniqueness and (strong) familiar-
ity as sufficient conditions for the felicitous use of definite descriptions, but differs from Schwarz
(2009) in how she implements this idea. Instead of an ambiguity analysis, Farkas proposes a theory
of ‘Determined Reference’, where uniqueness and familiarity are (disjunctively) used as pragmatic
cues towards reference disambiguation in definite descriptions. The set of data that is success-
fully explained under both of these hybrid analyses subsumes the data explained independently by
uniqueness theories as well as strong familiarity theories.
1.2 Current Study
In the current study, we employ a behavioral experiment to ask which notions of uniqueness and
familiarity (of the ones discussed above) are most relevant when it comes to interpreting definite
descriptions in English. Participants took part in a communication game wherein they were pre-
sented with descriptions of scenarios, and were asked to imagine themselves as one of the characters
in the scenario (i.e., the hearer). At the end of each description, participants interpreted a definite
description uttered by the character that they were interacting with (i.e., the speaker). The stories
varied with respect to the status of uniqueness and familiarity of the objects featured in them.
All targets and distractors were at least weakly familiar, as a result of their mere existence in
the scene. Additionally, in some situations, familiarity was manipulated to make the target or the
distractor strongly familiar. This was done by means of an explicit prior mention involving the en-
tity by either the speaker or the hearer. Similarly, while discourse uniqueness always minimally
held of the target referent, scenarios varied in whether or not stronger notions of uniqueness (seman-
tic/informational uniqueness) were satisfied. In order to distinguish between the notions of semantic
uniqueness and informational uniqueness, we included scenarios that introduced an explicit mis-
match in the knowledge states of the speaker and the hearer, as in the Donnellan (1966) scenarios
mentioned above. The set of descriptions that participants interpreted in our experiment did not
include any ‘weak definites’ (Poesio 1994 and following work). We focus only on ‘referential’
(instead of ‘attributive’, in the sense of Donnellan 1966) uses of definite descriptions.
2 Behavioral Experiment
2.1 Participants, Materials, Design
We tested 120 participants, recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service in exchange for mon-
etary compensation. Data from one participant was excluded due to technical errors. The experiment
was approved by the Johns Hopkins University Institutional Review Board, and participants indi-
cated their consent after reading an information letter.
In each trial, participants were presented with the description of a scenario and asked to imagine
themselves as one of the characters in it (the hearer). At the end of the trial, participants interpreted a
definite description uttered by the character that they were interacting with (the speaker). The stories
varied with respect to the status of uniqueness and familiarity of the possible referents featured in
them. An example trial is shown in Fig (1). In every scenario, two to three objects were featured
prominently, e.g., the labeled jar and the unlabeled jar in Fig (1). The description to be interpreted
(e.g., “the jar of camphor”) was independently known by the speaker and hearer to apply to one
or more objects in the scene. Crucially, our trials allowed for mismatches between the speaker’s
and the hearer’s knowledge. For instance, in Fig (1), the participant (or hearer) knew that both the
labeled and unlabeled jars contain camphor, making the description applicable to either jar from
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their perspective. However, relative to the auditor (i.e., the speaker), only the labeled jar could be
correctly referred to as “the jar of camphor”.
Figure 1: An example of a trial where informational uniqueness is true (only the labeled jar is known
to be a jar of camphor in the common ground) but semantic uniqueness is false. The unlabeled jar
is made strongly familiar using a deictic first mention.
We employed a 2 (Semantic uniqueness) x 2 (Informational uniqueness) x 3 (Strong familiarity)
within-subjects design, giving rise to 12 within-subjects conditions in total. Semantic uniqueness
was true within a trial as long as there was a unique referent in the scene that the description could
literally apply to. The presence or absence of the semantically unique object was always known to
the hearer. Informational uniqueness was true if there was a unique referent that the description
applied to in the common ground shared between speaker and hearer, regardless of actual facts. In
Fig (1) then, informational uniqueness is true because of the presence of a unique jar of camphor in
the common ground—i.e., the labeled jar; however, semantic uniqueness is false (as known to the
hearer), since both the labeled and unlabeled jars contain camphor.
The final factor that we systematically manipulated was Strong familiarity. In any trial, a
referent was strongly familiar if it had been mentioned prior to the utterance of the description to
be interpreted, either by the speaker or hearer. Every session contained three types of trials with
respect to this factor. First, there were trials in which no referent was strongly familiar. Second,
there were trials in which the strongly familiar referent satisfied the description as per both speaker
and hearer’s knowledge. Finally, there were trials in which the strongly familiar referent did not
satisfy the descriptive content as per one or both of the interlocutors. For instance, in Fig (1), the
strongly familiar referent is known by the hearer to be a jar of camphor, but not by the speaker.
The description to be interpreted was always of the form the NP. However, the form of the first
mention (when the referent was strongly familiar) was more variable: they could be definite expres-
sions, indefinite expressions, proper names or deictic expressions. Every subject participated in 12
trials, with each trial exemplifying one of the 12 possible conditions, and the order randomized. To
minimize any item effects, we adopted a fully crossed design where there were twelve instantiations
of each of twelve different story outlines, such that each instantiation corresponded to a different
condition. Each story was seen by ten participants (thus resulting in a total of 120 participants), and
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no participant was exposed to more than one instance of the same story outline. Participants were
instructed to take as much time as they needed. At the end of each trial, participants were asked
which object in the scene was intended by the speaker as the referent of the definite description.
They were allowed to choose between one of the prominently featured objects in the scene (e.g.,
either the labeled or the unlabeled jar in Fig 1), or refrain from picking any object by selecting the
option Don’t know instead. In addition, participants could choose to issue a clarification request in
the form of a constituent question or a yes/no question, but we will not analyze that data here.
2.2 Results
We performed a mixed-effects logistic regression, where the dependent variable indicated whether
participants picked one of the objects in the scene as the intended referent of the definite description
(“referential success”), instead of choosing the option Don’t know (“reference failure”). Our model
included semantic uniqueness, informational uniqueness and strong familiarity as categorical fixed
factors which were weighted-effects coded. We looked for main effects of each of these factors,
as well as interactions between them. The model included random intercepts for participants and
story outlines. In addition, we computed random slopes of the fixed factors for every story outline
in an attempt to measure any item effects. Below, we first report the results from comparing the
effectiveness of semantic vs. informational uniqueness as cues towards the interpretation of definite
descriptions. Following this, we report the effect of strong familiarity.
2.2.1 Semantic vs. Informational Uniqueness
The results indicate that the presence of informational uniqueness is more relevant in interpreting
definite descriptions and leads to greater referential success (β = 1.54, p < 0.001), although semantic
uniqueness also has a small effect (β = 0.57, p < 0.001). This suggests that participants in the
experiment reasoned with respect to the common ground shared by the speaker, rather than their
private beliefs. The data are shown in the red bars in Fig 2. Participants chose a referent about 87.5%
of the time when informational uniqueness was true. Of these, 86.2% of all choices corresponded
to the informationally unique referent, establishing informational uniqueness as an important clue
towards the identity of the intended referent. In the absence of informational uniqueness, a referent
was chosen only 46.1% of the time on average. In these cases, the chosen referent was mostly the
strongly familiar one, rather than the semantically unique one.
Figure 2: % referential success in varying conditions of informational and semantic uniqueness.
The red bars indicate the actual behavioral data obtained in our experiment. The blue bars indicate
predictions made by the rational computational model described in Section 3.
2.2.2 Informational Uniqueness vs. Strong Familiarity
Due to space constraints, and since the more relevant notion of uniqueness used in interpreting
definite descriptions was found above to be informational rather than semantic uniqueness, we will
here discuss only the effectiveness of strong familiarity against that of informative uniqueness. The
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participants’ data are depicted in the green bars in Fig (3), and lead to two main observations. First,
Fig (3) shows that informational uniqueness is sufficient for interpreting the description, regardless
of the status of strong familiarity of any object in the scene.
Figure 3: % referential success in varying conditions of uniqueness and strong familiarity. The
green bars indicate the actual behavioral data obtained in our experiment. The orange bars indicate
predictions made by the computational model described in Section 3.
Second, in trials where informational uniqueness was absent, the presence of a strongly familiar
referent was found to lead to referential success about 62.7% of the time, but only when it was known
in the common ground that the familiar object satisfied the description. In trials where the previously
mentioned object did not satisfy the description as per the common ground, strong familiarity was
largely irrelevant. Note that these trials include ones where the strongly familiar object was known
by the hearer to satisfy the description but not the speaker. This provides further evidence that the
participants reasoned with respect to the common ground, rather than their own private beliefs.
Regression results showed a significant main effect of strong familiarity (β=0.54, p=0.002),
however this effect is smaller than the one estimated above for informational uniqueness. We also
observed significant interaction between informational uniqueness and strong familiarity (β=-0.59,
p<0.001), as well as semantic uniqueness and strong familiarity (β=-0.44, p=0.003).
2.3 Discussion
There are two main insights to be gathered from our experimental results. First, we found that
informational uniqueness is used to a greater extent than semantic uniqueness in interpreting refer-
ring expressions, showing that participants in the experiment reasoned with respect to the common
ground they shared with the speaker, rather than their own private beliefs. Second, we found that
when faced with a situation where more than one referent in the common ground satisfies the de-
scription but only one is strongly familiar, hearers show a marked tendency to choose the strongly
familiar referent. However, strong familiarity is found to be less effective on average than informa-
tional uniqueness in leading to referential success.
These results are not exactly anticipated by any existing theory of definiteness in the literature.
They provide partial support for Roberts’ (2003) theory of informational uniqueness; but this theory
does not anticipate the effect of strong familiarity in the absence of such uniqueness. Our results
also partially accommodate the strong familiarity theories (Kamp 1981, Heim 1982), but these seem
to overestimate the helpful effect of strong familiarity in the absence of uniqueness.
The results are somewhat more compatible with hybrid theories of definiteness that see both
uniqueness and familiarity as being important factors affecting the interpretation of definite descrip-
tions. However, these theories still do not by themselves lead us to expect the gradedness that we
observe between the effects of uniqueness and familiarity, i.e., that uniqueness is apparently more
important, and that familiary operates only as a partially successful backup cue. It is somewhat more
problematic to account for such gradedness under an ambiguity theory of the definite determiner,
where the null hypothesis is that the two cues will be equally effective, than under an underspecifi-
cation theory like that of determined reference which does not commit to the exact mechanism by
which uniqueness and familiarity act to lead to referential success.
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Even though our results are suggestive of an under-determined semantics for the definite deter-
miner in the spirit of Farkas (2002), they can only be treated as a preliminary step towards subsequent
experimental investigation. For one thing, while strong familiarity was less effective than unique-
ness on average, we still observed substantial variability across trials. There were some trials where
strong familiarity helped as much as 90% of the time in achieving referential success, in some other
trials it was as low as 20%. This indicates that there might have been pragmatic factors within indi-
vidual trials that we did not control for—such as the perceptual salience of the objects in the scene
prior to the mention, or the precise forms of the first and subsequent mentions—that interacted with
strong familiarity. It may turn out that once all pragmatic factors are accounted for, an ambiguity
analysis can explain the observed data well enough, but the need for further work is clear.
3 Computational Model of Reference Resolution
The goal of this section is to describe a precise computational model of the process by which par-
ticipants in our study reasoned to arrive at the intended referent of the definite description. The
results hint at an interpretation process that is sensitive (to varying extents) to informational as well
as semantic uniqueness, as well the presence of strongly familiar objects in the context.
To explain the main patterns observed in our experimental data, we will build on the Rational
Speech Acts (RSA) model for reference resolution described in Frank and Goodman (2012) (a.o.).
This model is a natural choice with which to try and explain our data for two main reasons. First,
in an experiment such as ours which mimics natural discourse situations in letting the uniqueness
and familiarity of referents vary independently of one another, a Bayesian model proves useful since
it provides fairly direct ways of operationalizing the notions of uniqueness and familiarity. The
likelihood term within the equation for Bayes’ rule provides a proxy for encoding uniqueness, while
the prior term can be used to model effects of strong familiarity.
Second, the RSA framework explicitly models how a conversational agent accounts for their
interlocutor’s knowledge state via iterative Bayesian reasoning. This is quite directly useful in our
case—given that our data suggest that participants primarily reasoned with respect to the common
ground they shared with the speaker, rather than their own private beliefs. We do not intend to
suggest that the RSA model is the only one that can accomplish these two desiderata (see e.g.,
Heller et al. (2016)), but we leave exploration of other models to future work.
In the following subsections, we first describe the computational model in Frank and Goodman
(2012). Then, we describe a set of modifications to the original model that equips it to handle the
specific format of our experimental data. Finally, we report the effectiveness with which such a
model is capable of describing our experimental data.
3.1 Description of the Basic RSA Model
Consider a situation in which a speaker utters a description D1 to refer to one of two objects con-
tained within the scene: object A and object B. Let us further assume that the intended referent is
A, while B is a distractor. The description is chosen from among a finite set of possible descriptions
{D1,D2,D3, . . . ,Dn}. It is now the hearer’s job to try and map D1 to the intended referent A. In ef-
fect, we are interested in maximizing p(A |D1), which denotes the probability with which the hearer
picks A, upon hearing D1. The RSA is an iterative model, which assumes that both the speaker and
hearer are rational agents who make decisions by reasoning recursively over increasingly sophisti-
cated communicative partners. The simplest instantiation of the RSA is a two-level model where a
rational listener RL (whose behavior is of interest to us) reasons about a rational speaker RS, who in
turns reasons about a naive or literal listener, LL.
When D1 is uttered, LL uses the literal semantics of D1—notated as JD1K—in deciding whether
to choose A. The precise rule is as in (6). JD1K(A) evaluates to 1 just in case object A satisfies the
descriptive content of JD1K, and to 0 otherwise. P(A) denotes the prior probability of A being chosen
in the context, even before the D1 is uttered. When there is no particular reason to expect that one
referent is more likely to be talked about than another before the utterance of a description, the prior
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probability mass is assumed to be distributed among all the referents equally.
The job of the rational speaker RS is to decide whether to use the description D1 to describe the
intended referent A, out of the set of possible descriptions {D1,D2, . . . ,Dn}. To do this, they reason
over the behavior of LL according to (7), in order to try and maximize the chance of successful
interpretation of the description while minimizing the cost C of the utterance, usually proportional
to its length or some other type of complexity. α > 0 denotes a rationality parameter—the higher
the value of this parameter, higher the rationality of RS. Finally, the rational listener RL reasons
about RS’s behavior according to (8) in order to decide which of the two objects RS intends to
describe. (8) simply restates the standard Bayes’ rule: PRS(D1|A) represents the likelihood that the
rational speaker utters D1 to describe A, P(A) is the prior probability of choosing A. We assume, as is
standard in applications of the RSA model, that the participants in our experiments are instantiations
of the rational listener RL.
(6) PLL(A | D1) ∝ JD1K(A) ·P(A)
(7) PRS(D1 | A) ∝ exp(α(logPLL(A | D1)−C(D1)))
(8) PRL(A | D1) ∝ PRS(D1 | A) ·P(A)
3.2 Modifications to the Original Model
Here, we discuss four differences between our experimental conditions and the conditions that have
been canonically assumed in previous applications of the RSA. We propose modifications to the
original model to handle these differences.
The Set of Possible Utterances {D1,D2,D3, . . . ,Dn}
Most previous applications of the RSA model have assumed a finite set of hand-crafted utter-
ances, usually in toy contexts, that the speaker must choose from to describe a referent3. In our case,
where the set of possible descriptions varied from trial to trial, and furthermore each trial potentially
allowed for any number of descriptions, we use the following strategy for determining the lexicon.
Consider the same situation as before. To estimate the probability that the speaker would choose
D1 to identify object A, we need to also consider alternative expressions that could have been used
instead of D1. Towards this end, we abstract over individual descriptions, and instead group all
possible descriptions into the following coarse but exhaustive categories. D1 may belong to any of
these four categories in any trial (reasoning from the point of view of the speaker in our experiment):
(i) Descriptions that apply to A only, (ii) Descriptions that apply to B only, (iii) Descriptions that
apply to both A and B, (iv) Descriptions that apply to neither A nor B.
Incorporating Interlocutors’ Knowledge Mismatch
Typically, the RSA model is employed in situations where the literal semantics are shared by
both speaker and hearer. But assuming such a shared semantics wasn’t appropriate in our scenarios,
which were explicitly designed to provide hearers with privileged knowledge that wasn’t shared by
the speakers. To handle this, we assume that hearers start with a common ground-based semantics
(as the experimental results indicated); however, noise could be introduced by the hearer’s private
knowledge.4. This noise measure hr was included as a trained parameter in our model. The literal
semantics for referents A and B in the different types of trials computed according to this method
are shown in Table (1) below.
Incorporating the Effect of Strong Familiarity
In the general case, when there is no reason to expect that object A is more likely to be described
the speaker than object B (or vice versa), it is reasonable to assume that the prior probability is
distributed equally between A and B. However, once an object is made strongly familiar, it tends to
3An exception to this is Monroe and Potts (2015), which circumvents the need for manual specification of
the lexicon by inferring the lexicon from a corpus instead.
4The choice to treat interference from the hearer’s private knowledge as noise is entirely a model-internal
choice. See Heller et al. (2016) for an alternative view which treats hearers as reasoning independently over
both common ground and private beliefs, and using a weighted combination of the two to pick a referent.
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Potential targets according to
speaker’s knowledge
Potential targets according to
hearer’s knowledge
JD1]]K(A) JD1K(B)
A A 1 0
A,B A 1 1 - hr
A A,B 1 0 + hr
A,B A,B 1 1
Table 1: Literal semantics of the definite description D1 in the various conditions.
be more salient in the context when compared to the other weakly familiar items. Such increased
salience can be encoded within the model as a redistribution of prior probabilities, such that a greater
prior probability mass is assigned to the strongly familiar referent. Intuitively, this corresponds to
the idea that items that have been referred to previously are more likely to be referred to again.
When referent A is strongly familiar, the updated prior probability values are as shown in Equation
(9). The value of the parameter s will be estimated from data.
(9) P(A) = 0.5+ s P(B) = 0.5− s
Choosing the option Don’t know
Previous experimental studies on the interpretation of definite descriptions have typically adopted
a forced choice paradigm where participants must necessarily choose one of the possible items
within the context as the intended referent of a description D1. However, in real life, a third re-
sponse is possible wherein the hearer refrains from picking any referent and instead asks a clar-
ification question. This response was allowed in our experiment—participants could choose the
option Don’t know. Here, we propose a novel way to deduce the probability with which hearers
decide to choose the option Don’t know. Specifically, we hypothesize that this probability, denoted
as PRL(¬(A∨B) | D1) is inversely proportional to the difference between P(A | D1) and P(B | D1).
Intuitively, if the hearer believes that D1 is comparably likely refer to either A or B, their uncer-
tainty would lead them to refrain from picking any referent and ask a clarification question instead.
The function that determines PRL(¬(A∨B) | D1) must additionally fulfill the desideratum of being
bounded between 0 and 1. In light of this, we choose the functional form shown in Equation 10.
(10) PRL(¬(A∨B) | D1) = 11+eλ (|PRL(A|D1)−PRL(B|D1)|−c)
The parameters λ and cjointly determine the rate at which PRL(¬(A∨B) | D1) changes in re-
sponse to unit change in the difference between PRL(A | D1) and PRLB | D1). It is possible to
estimate λ and c from data, but for the sake of simplicity, we treat them as hyperparameters in our
model (λ=4, c=0.3).Once PRL(¬(A∨B) | D1) is computed, the final values PRL-final(A | D1) and
PRL-final(B | D1) are computed by renormalizing as in (11)-(12).
(11) PRL-final(A | D1) = (1−PRL(¬(A∨B) | D1))PRL(A | D1)
(12) PRL-final(B | D1) = (1−PRL(¬(A∨B) | D1))PRL(B | D1)
3.3 Model Evaluation
We trained the salience parameter s and the noise parameter hr on our experimental data, with an
objective function that maximized the likelihood of the observed data. As mentioned before, lambda
and c are taken to be hyperparameters in the model. So are the cost parameter C—set to 1 for all
descriptions, and the rationality parameter α—set to a conservative value of 1.
From Equation (9), it is easy to see that the possible values for s can range between 0 and
0.5. s is equal to 0 in a model that assumes no effect of strong familiarity, while s is equal to the
maximum value 0.5 in a model assuming maximal effect of strong familiarity. In the latter case, the
model’s predictions are expected to resemble those made by traditional familiarity-based theories
(Heim 1982, Kamp 1981), in that the strongly familiar item is expected to predominantly be chosen
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as the intended referent. However, given what we observed in our experiment, we might expect
s to lie not at either extremity, but somewhere in between 0 and 0.5. Sure enough, the maximum
likelihood estimate of s is found to be an intermediate value of 0.13.
The noise parameter hr could potentially range between 0 and 1, with lower values indicating
that hearers reason with respect to the common ground and higher values indicating that they are
more prone to reason with respect to their private beliefs. The best fit estimate of the noise parameter
hr was found to be a low value of 0.19—reflecting what was observed in the behavioral experiment.
The predictions made by the trained model are shown in the blue bars in Fig (2), and orange bars in
Fig (3). As apparent from these figures, the model fits the experimental data very closely.
4 Conclusion
The experimental results obtained in this study point towards a possible need for refinement of
the semantics the definite determiner (at least for English): the results are suggestive of a hybrid
method of resolving definiteness that incorporates both uniqueness and familiarity, but not in equal
measures. However, we leave open the question of whether this needs a novel lexical entry, or a
different approach to reference tracking/pragmatics to account for the item effects. Future work
must also investigate the full space of models that can characterize the experimental results, beyond
just the RSA-inspired model we have presented here.
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